th to the late 20 th century, the cities and industries of the world became increasingly reliant on fireproof materials made from asbestos. In focusing on the town of Asbestos, Canada, this paper will show how this process of market boom and bust shaped a fierce local culture rooted in working and living on a rapidly changing environment. By analyzing the successive expansions of the giant mine located in the centre of Asbestos, this paper will highlight how unique understandings of self and place develop in mining communities and form a complex culture rooted in a constantly changing environment.
Asbestos was circular, and created a rounded knoll absolutely full of the mineral. This meant that only one mine was needed to extract the valuable mineral in an open cast operation.
The people of Asbestos had built their community literally on top of this wide-ranging mineral deposit. Asbestos was a single resource community, with the mine located at the centre of town, and operated by the American JohnsManville Company (JM).
1 JM took full control of the Jeffrey Mine in 1916, just as the asbestos industry was beginning to boom because of the mineral's numerous wartime uses, including being used in soldier's uniforms. JM was historically a manufacturer of materials used in the construction industry, and the fireproof mineral that could strengthen most products it was added to was central to the company's growth. Even before 1916, the majority of the asbestos extracted from the Jeffrey Mine went directly to JM factories in the United States, and the company had become the largest manufacturer of asbestos-based products in the world. 2 At this time, the majority of asbestos was used in the construction industry, and several American and European companies began to include these fireproof, durable new products. Within a decade, however, asbestos came to be used in a variety of other fields, most significantly in the automobile industry, which used the mineral in brake pads and a number of other components. Investing in an asbestos mine -and an asbestos mining community -thus made good business sense for JM, especially as the company rightly anticipated the high profits that could come from post-war European reconstruction and American urban and suburban growth. While the industry relied on the local population to extract the mineral, that very same local population also hindered the expansion of the mine, and therefore the market, through the sheer fact of their presence on the land. As townspeople framed their lives around the mine -with residential and commercial streets branching from its crater-like 3 presence -global markets significantly impacted how they did so throughout the "boom years" of the industry, .
The nature of open cast mining is that it never remains stagnant, and the pit must always be expanded in order to access more of the mineral. However, because the town of Asbestos was built around the Jeffrey Mine, this meant that || 1-The company was originally named the H.W. Johns-Manville Co., and did not officially become "Johns-Manville" until 1930. However, because of its more recognizable name and because most studies of the industry refer to it as JM, this article will exclusively refer to it as Johns-Manville for consistency. each time JM expanded the limits of the pit to access more fibre, part of the community was consumed by it. From 1928 From -1980 , Asbestos became a "rolling" mining community (see Figure 1) . Townspeople moved homes, businesses, and other local facilities and infrastructure away from the edges of the Jeffrey Mine, but not far enough away that their properties were safe from future pit expansion.
2-The
Due to this tradition, locally the Jeffrey Mine was referred to as "the mine that ate the village."
Through analysing the eleven Jeffrey Mine expansions that occurred from , this article examines the fundamental local-global dilemma present in the town of Asbestos. International markets dictated when the Jeffrey Mine needed to be expanded so workers could extract more fibre, geology dictated where it should be expanded, and the local population -so crucial to meeting these market demands and so knowledgeable of the mineral itself -needed to be close enough to do the required labour for the expansion and extraction of raw asbestos, but far away enough so their living space would not impede development. JM was responsible for deciding when and how the Jeffrey Mine would expand, with little consideration for the local population: global markets and rising profits were what mattered most.
Global control of the resource removed agency from local workers and government officials. For example, while the community was French Canadian, JM employed Anglophone engineers and geologists to lead these expansions. This prevented local workers from advancing up the company ranks and removed them from any discussions regarding the ways in which the Jeffrey Mine would be expanded into the community. Furthermore, it kept locals firmly in the category of "unskilled" workers, which erased their expertise gained from living on and working underneath the land for generations. By examining this process, this article shows how the tensions caused by this local-global dilemma were negotiated and experienced in the community. It will trace the development of a strong local identity that was linked to the global asbestos industry that dictated the development of the community. It will also highlight the resilience of mining communities in the face of adapting to day to day realities beyond their control.
Being close to both work and civic life, the homes and businesses immediately surrounding the Jeffrey Mine were actually some of the most desirable in Asbestos. This desirability contributed to townspeople's willingness to accommodate the growing needs of the industry, which included their seeming compliance when they dismantled their homes near the edges of the mine and relocated them further away each time the company planned an expansion into the community. While it certainly was inconvenient to move your home every 5-10 years, mine expansion usually meant the industry -and therefore the community -was booming. This was a place focused on the future, not the past, and most townspeople were prepared to make any sacrifice they needed to in order to guarantee success. This became especially important when the industry began to crumble as reports of the negative health effects of asbestos became wellknown in the western world. However, at the start of the 20 th century, the asbestos industry was booming, and JM helped facilitate an industrial revolution to the natural phenomenon that was the underground terrain at Asbestos.
Boom and Bust
Asbestos was not the only town in the region that mined the mineral, and at the start of the 20 th century, the Jeffrey Mine was among the most undeveloped and unprofitable mines. This was largely because the companies that had operated it lacked the geological knowledge to understand and access the unusual deposit at its full potential. 4 This was not a problem for JM, as the company had the funds to hire geologists and engineers who could understand the deposit at Asbestos in ways previous companies -indeed even the local population -could not. American money and connections revolutionized the land in Asbestos, and the Jeffrey Mine quickly became an efficient, quasi-natural machine, with spiralling benches winding from the bottom to the top, steam shovels, derricks, and, soon enough, a train transporting the mineral from the bottom of the pit to the nearby Grand Trunk Railway line.
5
JM brought a "bigger is better" mentality to the small mining community. The fact that it was a company linked to a growing global industry suggested to the local population that it could be trusted after previous smaller companies had led to local instability. 6 The local population quickly grew around the mine and both men and women found employment there. Everything -and everyone -in Asbestos became oriented towards, and devoted to, the mine and industry, which is often a precarious situation for single industry resource communities. 7 || 4-Indeed, the first owners of the Jeffrey Mine went bankrupt in 1892 despite the rise in demand for the mineral. J. van Even for the merchants who operated local stores, JM provided the necessary salaries for local customers: the Jeffrey Mine was the reason for being in Asbestos, and without its continued development, the community would collapse. Indeed, the company even supplied electricity to the entire town, with the mayor's home being the first to have this new technology installed. This trust, and perhaps even faith in the mine took root as the community was swept through the various booms and busts of the global industry.
International market growth directly led to the necessary growth of the Jeffrey Mine itself. With JM's connections, the deposit had quickly become central to the global industry. The company raised extraction levels at the pit to feed its vast network of processing plants throughout the United States. The pit rapidly consumed the land that separated the edges of the mine from the community. In 1923, Asbestos town council had given the company permission to "move" one of the major roads in the town by 66 feet. Local residents were in danger of flying rocks, as many family homes were located on this road that wound around the edges of the mine. Foremost, however, the removal of the road was to facilitate easier shipment of raw asbestos from the Jeffrey Mine to international processing plants. The local government agreed to the move because it wanted to make industrial development of the land as easy as possible for JM, as the industry was "so essential to the life and interest of the local community."
8 The "moving" of a road was phase one of JM's initial plans for development and expansion; phase two was coming quickly.
In 1927, the population of Asbestos had grown to over 3,000 people. The physical limits of the community needed to grow alongside this population, and the provincial government granted the town's request to extend the borders of Asbestos by 17,588 square feet. JM was now the community's largest landholder after owning the Jeffrey Mine for just over ten years, and this distinction afforded it a significant amount of influence in municipal affairs. 9 As soon as the provincial government gave the town of Asbestos permission to extend its borders to accommodate a growing population, JM asked town council if the company could purchase 55 acres of the community's total 800 acres in order to expand the Jeffrey Mine.
10 Decisions regarding community land were entirely under the local authority, and the town council could decide to change land use from residential or commercial to industrial if and when it deemed this change was needed. The fact that JM was willing to pay the town good money for the land and that the company had two of its officials appointed to the local council likely hastened these agreements.
Because the Jeffrey Mine was an open pit, there were limits to what workers could reasonably and safely extract: by 1928, the mine resembled a steep inverted cone, rather than the spiralling circle it was when JM had taken over operations in 1916. Landslides were common, and extraction levels were shrinking because of a lack of physical space. Because of the circular nature of the deposit at Asbestos, operations had to expand both vertically and horizontally to access its depths. Not knowing this when the town was founded, the people of Asbestos had to accommodate horizontal mine growth throughout the 20 th century in order to allow for safe and rapid vertical mine growth. The speed in which JM increased its vertical extraction levels also increased the frequency of its horizontal growth into the community.
Driving this landscape change was the fact that prices for asbestos were rising internationally, and Canada provided 85 percent of the global supply of the mineral (see Figure 2 ), with 247,691 short tons worth $11,283,361 in 1928. 11 This was a massive industry and JM required unobstructed freedom to exploit the land at Asbestos, located in "the most important asbestos producing region in the world."
12
For the most part, the community could see that mine expansion was the logical next step. Workers did not want to continue working in an unsafe environment, and JM had promised to build new homes for all those whose houses would be destroyed by pit expansion. These new homes would be located further away from the edges of the mine, and equipped with all the modern conveniences residents of Asbestos had yet to experience, including electricity and indoor plumbing. 13 This was the type of municipal investment townspeople had been waiting for, as the community was transformed from a small mining town to an industrial centre. Of course, a major issue that nobody seemed to take notice of at the time was that while residents had owned their homes at the edge || 11-This article employs a variety of "tons" throughout, but makes clear which unit is being employed according to the source material. Because of this, the majority of weight measurements are given in the English, or long, ton, which is 2,240lbs, and is the measurement the majority of my sources employ, and thus unless noted, this is the weight I am referring to. The American, or short, ton, which is 2,000lbs, is also used, and noted each time. The metric tonne, weighing 2,204.6lbs, is occasionally used in my sources, and when it is, I note it. 12-Asbestos: Its Sources, Extraction, Preparation, Manufacture, and Uses in Industry and Engineering, Berlin 1928, p. 17. 13-R. Lampron/M. Cantin/É. Grimard, Asbestos: Filons d 'Histoire, 1899 -1999 , Asbestos 1999 of the pit, they would not own these new ones. Instead, they would rent them from the company, making them more mobile and less legally -if not emotionally -attached to one specific place or building. There is a discrepancy in the figure for 1922, which reads as 108 percent of global supply, which is obviously incorrect, although I have found no data to suggest which number is wrong, so I have left it as is.
In 1928 JM quickly and efficiently destroyed these old homes as well as the entire original section of town, which had historically been referred to by the local population as the "nerve centre" of the community.
14 This was the first in a long line of large scale mine expansions in Asbestos. Amid promises of the company building a new commercial centre, JM quickly and efficiently demolished a significant portion of the community, and put up the first barbed wire fence between the edges of the mine and town roads.
There remained a small, yet vocal segment of the population of Asbestos that disagreed with the town council allowing JM to expand its operations so aggressively: the community's merchant class. Although their revenue was tied to the wages the majority of townspeople received from Johns-Manville, local merchants refused to hand over their property to the company and move their businesses elsewhere. Out of the over 3,000 people in Asbestos at the start of the 1930s, only eight officially protested the mine's expansion. All of these eight were local merchants whose businesses would be affected by the reorganization of roads and neighbourhoods the expansion required. These merchants claimed that in granting JM permission to destroy the centre of Asbestos, town council was acting in the interest of Johns-Manville, not the community. 15 Despite this small faction disagreeing with the plans for mine expansion during the early years of the Great Depression, when the mayor passed the matter onto the province for a final verdict, the government wholeheartedly agreed to it and passed a Bill of Expropriation to overrule any local protest.
The fact that only a small number of residents protested JM's plans for expansion is significant, as it informs us of the incredible dependency the local population had on the company and the industry. Although it did not have any legal authority to change roads and force citizens to move their homes, the economic power JM held within the community, the province, and the global industry lent it considerable influence. Much like those in other single industry, single company towns in North America during the 19 th and 20 th centuries, the people of Asbestos were vulnerable to the company's ambitions, unable to object too strongly so as to deter future development. 16 In 1929, global consumption of asbestos was 240,000 metric tons, which then fell to 192,000 metric tons in 1930 due to the Great Depression, falling all the way to 80,500 metric tons by 1932.
17
Although these numbers were still relatively high during a major economic crisis, the community of Asbestos experienced this drop in production and de- mand through layoffs, mine closure, and the inability to feed their families. Anything that could boost production at the Jeffrey Mine was encouraged, and JM's planned expansion for after the Depression could not be hindered.
Thus, for most in the community, it seemed that what was destroyed was not as important as what was maintained: mine expansion ensured the town had a purpose, citizens would have jobs, and everyone would prosper. The destruction of the original section of town reinforced the idea that Asbestos was a place with a future, not a past, and the local population had to let go of the original bones of the community in order to succeed. Not even the Great Depression hitting the community at the start of JM's expansion efforts seemed to shake this conviction for most of the local population.
Because of the close ties the company had developed with American automotive and manufacturing industries during the 1920s, JM was forced to shut down its operations in Asbestos between May 1932 and April 1933. These sectors were particularly hard hit by the Great Depression. This was a devastating time for the community of Asbestos, and many had to rely on government aid to feed their families during this period of economic crisis. However, because of its previous economic buoyancy, the government rightly believed that the asbestos industry would be one of the major factors in the province's emergence from the Depression. Even if the mine destroyed segments of the community, it was simply far too important to the provincial economy to be limited by space. In 1929, just prior to the economic crisis, the industry had brought $13,172,581 in tax revenue to the province. At the Depression's lowest point in 1932, asbestos industry revenue had dropped almost $10,000,000 to just $3,039,721, but this was still a significant amount of money and helped the government manage the crisis.
18
The temporary mine closure taught the local population a valuable lesson on what life would be like in the community if JM was not able to develop the mine as it wanted. This was a town that was founded and sustained only because of the asbestos industry. Without it, the local population would lack any means of income or support. This led the community to have a renewed appreciation for industry leader JM. The company recovered from the Depression much quicker than many other companies, which also meant that Asbestos also recovered from the economic crisis faster than comparable communities in the region. By the end of 1933, the global demand for asbestos had increased to 112,000 metric tons, production had risen by 29 percent, the Jeffrey Mine had reopened, and || 18-M. Vallières, http://www.mern.gouv.qc.ca/mines/desminesetdeshommes/index.jsp# annexe, oct 2015.
local workers had returned to their jobs. 19 It seemed like the sacrifice to both land and heritage had indeed been worth it, and townspeople had learned to trust JM's expertise.
Even though extraction levels at the Jeffrey Mine did not reach pre-Depression levels until the industry boom that came with the Second World War, local employees worked an average of 58 hours a week by 1935, and could once again support their families. The hard years of the Depression were soon forgotten as Canadian production levels rose sharply in the second half of the 1930s, with 247,954 metric tons of raw asbestos being extracted in 1936, worth $9,958,183, and 337,443 metric tons worth $14,505,541 in 1937. 20 Only five percent of the raw fibre was processed in Canada, and most of the rest went directly to JM's large network of processing plants in the United States.
These high levels of production once again contributed to the Jeffrey Mine becoming unworkable, with its sides sloping sharply up, causing landslides and delays. JM appealed to the municipal council in 1938 to again expand its operations onto 14 undeveloped lots at the edge of the Jeffrey Mine. The local government again immediately granted the request.
21 Town council also purchased 21 lots of land from neighbouring farmers on which it could develop new residential space after the enlarged Jeffrey Mine had encompassed the original sections of the community designated for housing. 22 This second expansion was due to rising international demand, and established a tradition of global forces dictating local land change. By 1939, the Jeffrey Mine had expanded vertically and horizontally so significantly that it had become the largest asbestos mine in the world. 23 It remained the largest asbestos mine for much of the 20 th century because the local population allowed global demand to dictate land use in the community.
Industry magazines like the Canadian Mining Journal fawned over the impressive operations at Asbestos, which extracted an immense 3 million long tons of rock each year from the 300 foot wide, 510 foot deep pit. In 1939 the Journal wrote that your first impression of the Jeffrey Mine was "one of size. Here is an operation that handles great quantities of material, and uses mammoth 24 There was real excitement surrounding the asbestos industry -and, in particular, the town of Asbestos -at the end of the 1930s, and its continuation seemed certain.
Industry leaders saw the mid-20 th Century as the "Asbestos Age," and the US Minerals Yearbook described it as being "indispensable to modern life" at the outbreak of the Second World War, when global consumption of the fibre rose to 232,000 metric tons. 25 The Jeffrey Mine had become both a natural and technological phenomenon, and this international status further solidified the local devotion to the mine, the company, and the industry. This devotion was capitalized upon by the international industry during the Second World War. Shifts at the Jeffrey Mine ran 24 hours a day, seven days a week to ensure production levels met wartime demand. Indeed, the majority of able-bodied men living in Asbestos did not enlist in the military to serve in Europe, but instead stayed at home to work in the mine. Canadian asbestos production rose by more than 100,000 short tons during the war partly because of these local efforts.
26
Asbestos-containing products had risen in popularity after the First World War, and this rise became exponential during and after the Second World War. New technologies of both war and peace relied on the mineral for strength, durability, and protection from fire. This included traditional construction and automobile components, but the mineral was also added to sheeting used in fighter jets and commercial airplanes, filters for baby incubators, and fabrics to cover soft furnishings in the domestic realm. The diversification and expansion of asbestos goods into new markets, combined with postwar European reconstruction and the North American suburban boom meant that by 1948 Jeffrey Mine workers extracted between 19,000 and 22,760 tons of rock every 24 hours, compared to the 389,688 tons they had extracted per annum just ten years earlier. 27 This increased production led to the Jeffrey Mine becoming 3,200 feet 
29
A lengthy five month strike at the start of 1949 halted both local and global production of the mineral. Whereas global consumption of the mineral was 613,000 metric tons in 1948, it fell to 484,000 metric tons in 1949 due to this labour dispute. 30 When workers returned to the Jeffrey Mine in the spring, they were confronted with the fact that their local labour dispute had left the global industry with a shortage of approximately a quarter of a million short tons of asbestos.
31 While the Jeffrey Mine was only one of several Canadian asbestos mines, its sheer size and connections to the lucrative American market meant that its workers exercised significant control over the flow of raw asbestos internationally. Indeed, despite the strike, by 1950 Canada still controlled 61 percent of the global asbestos industry, worth $64 million.
32 Because of the shortage, the market price for raw asbestos rose, and JM raised production targets at the Jeffrey Mine so it could maximize profits during this window of opportunity.
From Magic Mineral to Killer Dust

33
The increase in extraction levels at the mine meant that the pit would soon come close to its physical limits within the town of Asbestos once again. Jeffrey Mine workers extracted on average three times more asbestos each year than those at other Canadian mines; landslides again became common and production slowed due to the lack of horizontal space. It was clear to everyone in the community that another expansion was necessary, but attitudes towards JM had changed during the lengthy strike of 1949, and the local population was less willing to sacrifice its land for the company's profits. Sensing this shift in local dynamics, instead of expanding the edges of the mine onto community land, JM instead developed a block-caving system that established shafts around the perimeter of the pit. These shaft mines allowed workers to extract a significant amount of raw asbestos without significantly infringing on municipal land. In fact, the only community members who voiced complaints about this new method were again local merchants. Indeed, the first shafts the company built lined Rue Bourbeau, which was the main commercial street in Asbestos. By 1952, each block was 200 square feet, had crushing plants 816 feet below ground, and loading facilities 950 feet down. 34 What particularly frustrated local merchants was the smoke, noise, and dust these shafts and crushing plants expelled into the air, discouraging people from shopping in local stores. These efforts helped raise Canadian asbestos production from 784,556 short tons, or 61 percent of the global consumption in 1950, to 822,112 short tons, or 70 percent of global consumption by 1952. 35 Rising production levels at the Jeffrey Mine helped workers become the highest paid miners in Canada during the 1950s. It also signalled to townspeople that despite the shaft mines surrounding the pit, the company needed to significantly expand its operations in the near future because production levels were so high that the shafts were reaching the end of their supply of the mineral. The editor of the local paper wrote about this eventuality in 1956, stating that the global industry's demands on the land in Asbestos meant that soon enough, the Jeffrey Mine will have consumed the entire community, and residents would be displaced to neighbouring towns due to a lack of liveable space.
36
JM did not attempt to pacify local fears concerning future mine expansion. In fact, when the company submitted an application to town council at the end of the 1950s for a gradual, yet massive mine expansion, it also laid off 120 of its shaft mine employees because new extraction technologies made them redundant.
37 JM also cautioned the council against purchasing additional land for the community to grow onto once the expansion had been completed, as it anticipated needing less employees in the future because of these new technologies.
In a drastic shift from established practice, local residents -not just the local merchants -began to refuse to sell their property near the mine's edges to JM. If townspeople did not see direct benefits from the company's expansion onto community land in terms of stable jobs and wages, they would prevent it in any way they could. In reality, there was little community members could do to limit the Jeffrey Mine's growth: JM appealed for help to the provincial government in 1964, which passed another Bill of Expropriation. 38 The asbestos industry was too important to the provincial and federal economy to limit its growth, and the government was not willing to challenge JM on its managerial practices as long as it was gaining substantial revenue.
The Jeffrey Mine's inevitable expansion was something most townspeople accepted, despite growing opposition to it starting in the 1950s. Local merchants were once again concerned about what it would mean for their businesses. A group of them appealed to the provincial government to reconsider the Bill of Expropriation on the grounds that their profits would be affected by the disruption the project would cause. However, the industry was worth over $148 million in tax revenue to the province, and JM had assured the government its planned expansion of the Jeffrey Mine would be worth over $20 million. 39 The merchants' complaints were again dismissed and the expansion went ahead, first consuming the main church in the community, then the main commercial district.
By 1967, 250 buildings and 54 percent of the town centre had been consumed by the Jeffrey Mine since 1918. 40 The local population could no longer recognize its community, but through working at the Jeffrey Mine, they supplied the global industry with 1,172,346 short tons of raw asbestos that year. 41 Looking favourably on what JM had done to local land in its quest for more profit, the Canadian Mining Journal declared the community to be an impressive "industrial complex," and the "Free World's Largest Asbestos Producer," which had gotten rid of all the tired old buildings that used to be present in the town.
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Local land had indeed become part of a massive industrial complex, but what the journal failed to acknowledge were the effects this had on the local population living around the giant mine in the centre of town. By 1968, local residents began complaining that they were forced to "dine on dust and noise" because of the expansion, and they lobbied town council to establish a 1,000-foot buffer zone between the edges of JM property and community land. the help of JM funds donated for community development, council established this buffer zone and constructed a 200 foot long wall to restrict mine activities from impacting community life. This was a first in Asbestos, which had historically embraced the blurred lines between the mine and community land, and it demonstrated the real struggles the local population had keeping up with the global demand for the mineral that gave the town its name.
Although employment at the Jeffrey Mine was not significantly rising, Asbestos had run out of housing for its population. Despite JM cautioning the town council against purchasing new land for residential purposes, the town council had to appeal to the provincial housing association for help in building new homes to house local families. A significant amount of homes were destroyed by the expansion and the local population needed space to live. Even though workers were being laid off at the Jeffrey Mine, they were staying in Asbestos, hoping to be hired back as markets and production continued to grow.
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After their homes and businesses had been sacrificed several times to enable JM's expansion efforts, the negative health effects of the mineral became more widely known and the industry began to collapse in the 1970s. The western world's demand for asbestos began to significantly drop as the awareness of the health risks the mineral posed increased, and the American Environmental Protection Agency began a campaign against its use. For instance, in 1968, global consumption of the fibre reached 741,000 metric tons, but by 1975, that figure had dropped to 552,000 metric tons. 45 With a crashing American market and a closing European one, townspeople quickly became aware that they were facing a crisis much different in nature than the Depression. The toxicity of the product that gave the community its name was also what would cause its ruin.
JM knew the industry was in trouble during the 1970s -the company was in serious financial trouble too due to occupational health lawsuits filed against the company by its American workers -and officials attempted to get as much asbestos out of the Jeffrey Mine as they could before the industry completely collapsed. Although profits and demand for asbestos were dwindling, and JM began laying off employees by the hundreds, the global industry was still worth over $210 million by 1972. 46 The company began to raise production levels at the mine while profits remained relatively high, and indeed, that same year JM informed 160 local residents that they had to move their homes in order to ac- Mining Journal, February 1972, p. 139. commodate mine expansion, prompting the local paper to write, "But where can they go?" 47 Some of these 160 residents lived in rented company accommodation, so JM had the final say on the location of their homes. However, others lived in homes they had built or purchased themselves, and many objected to the company telling them they had to move. Although JM had no actual authority to force homeowners to move, their alliance with the town council and the provincial government gave them lobbying weight to convince these governmental bodies to agree to land expropriation legislation, requiring local residents to relocate away from the mine.
46-Canadian
Homes were already at risk of sliding into the pit, and roads extending from the pit into the community were twisted and torn up as the Jeffrey Mine quickly, aggressively, and noisily expanded into the town. Rocks flew out of the mine and throughout the community as JM increased blasting schedules and became more ambitious and extreme in its activities. The town council began closing key streets to ensure community safety, which had never happened before to this extreme level in the history of the community: the mine had become a public danger. 48 This was a community -and industry -in crisis. By 1977, Quebec's asbestos production had risen to 1,251,518 short tons, and townspeople in Asbestos had started describing JM's activities at the Jeffrey Mine as "acts of vandalism." Rocks continued to be blasted into the community from the pit, putting the local population at risk, especially as the 1,000 foot buffer zone that the council had previously established was destroyed by mine development.
49 Increased production at the mine had increased its size to 6,500 feet from east to west, 6,000 feet from north to south, and 1,000 feet deep. When the company put its plans in motion to consume the land 200 locallyowned buildings were on, townspeople appealed to the local council to do something to establish a safe distance between the community and the "cratère d'exploitation" the mine had become by 1981. 50 It is significant to note that at the height of the western world's awareness of the dangers the mineral posed to human health, the people of Asbestos, who lived and worked beside the largest asbestos mine in the world, were mainly concerned with protecting their homes from mine expansion, not their children from asbestos-related disease. Much of this was because JM-funded doctors had lied to local residents about the effects of asbestos on their health from the be- ginning of the company's ownership of the mine. 51 This had a lasting impact on the way townspeople understood asbestos-related disease, as they were continuously told they were sick or their loved ones had died because of lifestyle choices, like smoking, rather than their daily interaction with asbestos.
52 Furthermore, as a community entirely dependent on the industry, the people of Asbestos knew it was the issue of health that was making it unstable. Keeping silent on this issue would perhaps help sustain the global industry and the local economy, but only if it did not cost townspeople their community.
Local silence on the health effects of asbestos did not prevent the industry from crumbling and JM from declaring bankruptcy in 1982 due to the significant number of occupational health lawsuits it faced in the United States. The company sold the Jeffrey Mine to a group of its Canadian executives and left Asbestos in 1983 as the community began a period of instability and uncertainty it has yet to emerge from. When reporting on the company's bankruptcy, the local paper articulated townspeople's concerns when it reported that without JM, Asbestos would collapse.
53 Between 1977 and 1987 , the global consumption of the fibre had dropped from 610,000 to just 84,000 metric tons.
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JM had been the industry's leader for decades, and no other company had the money or connections required to sustain a positive image of the mineral. Expansion plans into the town were halted by the mine's new owners. The provincial and federal governments gave millions in subsidies and sought new markets in the developing world to sell Canada's raw asbestos to. The population of Asbestos began to bleed out, shifts became limited to four or six months a year, and extraction levels dropped so sharply due to the diminished market demand for the dangerous mineral that expansion was not necessary for almost 20 years. Asbestos, the mineral, continues to cause the deaths of approximately 90,000 people each year. 55 Asbestos, the community, is an artefact in and of itself detailing the ways in which multinational corporations change and impact local environments in pursuit of profits within the resource industry, and how those in the immediate vicinity of their operations are vulnerable to the effects of their ambitions. Everyone in Asbestos wanted the Jeffrey Mine to do well, and townspeople took great pride in its international notoriety as being the largest chrysotile asbestos mine in the world, supplying global markets with a supposedly life-saving and life-enhancing mineral. However, how the company operated in order to make the Jeffrey Mine so successful was not always in accordance with how the local population saw the balance between land meant for work and land meant for community life. As extraction levels rose throughout the 20 th century, the Jeffrey Mine needed to grow horizontally as well as vertically in order to access more fibre in a safe way. This simple fact meant that community land use and ownership changed time and time again: Roads were moved, homes were demolished, businesses closed, and the company's holdings grew. The burden of moving community infrastructure and residential space 11 times between 1928 and 1980 was born by townspeople and local government with relatively little complaint, as they were entirely dependent on JM and the industry for their economic stability. In many ways, this made them powerless against the company's desire for profit. Indeed, this article has shown that while the local population exercised a degree of agency within the community when it came to decisions regarding the sale of new land to the company and the expansion of the mine, their voice was certainly not as strong as the company's clout within the province due to its economic weight. Time and time again, government officials sided with JM in land disputes, and allowed the company to expand the mine onto residential and commercial space in Asbestos, to the detriment of community infrastructure.
By examining mine expansion in Asbestos, we see an interesting shift occurring. In the early "boom" years of the asbestos industry, even during the Depression, the majority of local residents supported the idea that everything in the community needed to be oriented towards the future. At the beginning of || 55-"Quebec cancer walk nixed over asbestos spat," CBC News, 6 July 2010. http://www. cbc.ca/ health/story/2010/07/06/montreal-cp-asbestos-cancels-cancer-walk.html?ref=rss, July 2010. The Canadian Cancer Society provides financial support, group therapy, and palliative care to many community members dying of asbestos-related cancers. the 1970s, however, the local belief in this future was profoundly shaken. The town of Asbestos is now in an uncertain state. After being so central to local identity, even during the massive mine expansion projects townspeople objected to, the land in Asbestos is now frozen, and the community's future appears increasingly finite. This is difficult for a community whose mantra had been that it was a place with a future, not a past, to understand. This highlights an important aspect of resource communities: what happens to these places when the industry they rely on for their livelihood and identity collapses? How does a population reliant on the toxic land they live upon reconcile the harm they do with the only way of life they have ever known? The extended life of the Jeffrey Mine -and the town of Asbestos -is over, and the community is no longer a place with a future, simply a past found at the bottom of a massive open pit mine.
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